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COMPARATIVE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONAL
PERFORMANCE IN RURAL BANKING INSTITUTIONS*
by
C_sar G. Salda_a**,
I. INTRODUCTION•
Various government policies and programs have focused on the
• : f, •
ways to expand and increase the quality of bank'i.ng services .in
• . ,, ,
the rural areas., Most of these efforts were specifically
directed at financing programs and rpgulatory policies meant to
promote the effective participation,...of basking institutions in
the rural financial system. Because. of their economic importance
*Paper presented during the ACPC-PIDS-OSU sponsored seminar-
workshop on "Financial Intermediation in the Rural Sector:
Research Results and Policy Issues" held on 26-27 September 1988
at the Cuaderno Hall, Central Bank of the Philippines., This is
part of a larger study on..comparative, bank analysis jointly con-
ducted by .the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC), Philip-
pine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS), and Ohio State
University (OSU). T.he project was coordinated:by Dr. Mario B.
Lamberte (PIDS) and Dr. V. Bruce J. Tolentino (ACPC).
**Price Waterhouse/Joaquin Cunanan & Co. Professor of
Accounting at the College of Business Administrat.ion, University
of the Philippines.
The views expressed in this.study are those of theauth and
do not•necessarily reflect those of the Institute, ,
2in therural areas, policymakers needto regularly monitor their
activities and performance,,
The objectives of this study are: to descr,u= a,,u uv
evaluate the observed management structure, policies and
practices of three major types of banking organizations operating
in the 'rural areas. These private banking institutions - rural
banks, private development banks and branches of commercial banks
- represent .the major part of the rural financial system.
Interest in rural financial institutions (RFIs) is due to the
ongoing reforms in the financial system which point towards
allowing for increased free play of private, incentives in
financial markets. In the past, government banks like the
Philippine National Bank and the Development Bank of the
Philippines assumed, a considerable role in rural finance.
In this study, the organizational, a;id management
characteristics of the three; types of institutions are presented
on a comparative basis, evaluated, and then related to their
overall performance. The results are intended to contribute to a
better understanding of how government policies and market
conditions determine the management set-up of these institutions
and influence their operating and financial performance.
A descriptive model of interaction between market,
organizational structure, and policy and institutional
performance is presented in Section 2. This section also covers
the operational definition of these variables including several
hypotheses which are suggested by the descriptive model.
.-Section. 3 describes the •survey data.. SectiOn, 4 ,.reviews some
government regulatory and policy ini,tiativesWhi;C, •impinge om
management structure and policy choices by RFIs. Related
findings by prior studies are also reviewed. _ec_lon 5 cover8
the observed management structure and policies and analyzes the
data for the three classes of RFIs on an individual and
.. ,.
comparative basis. Section 6 extends the analysis to relate
1?
management structure and policies with overall financial anti
operating performance of the RFIs. The last section presents
some conclusions of the study andsuggestsareas for extension
and analysis_
II. A FRAMEWORKFOR RELATING MANAGEMENTSTRUCTURE WITH
INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE
This study of the management aspects of,RFIs _adopts th_
familiar contingenc y,;model used in business policy and control.
The model simply , states that an organization and management
policies represent _-he firm's•way of innovating to .survive and
grow in the face of,,p_eva,i,ling regu)ation/leg_l structure in the
• , .... _ '_ ,.,•
marketplace, in short, management policies artd pra_tices are the
RFI's means of competing. These are methods chosen by management
"to exploit opportunities available in the market while avoiding
constraints of regulations or its own weaknesses (e.g., resource
limitations). Self-interest behavior is at the core of this
I : I !
framework. '_The RFI will seek to maX_'mize its returns (commensu-
1/
For example, see Porter (1980) and Soriano (1976).
4rate with risk) when selecting from •among alternative policies
available to the RFI management;
Management structure consists of organization structure,
staffing, and policies guiding the operations of a bank. The
impact of.regulationsand market changes on bank performance can
be better understood in the context of this management structure
of RFIs. In this study, these management aspects are described
and related to the _erformance of individual RFIs.
The .interaction of management structure with market
conditions and regulations is reflected in a schematic diagram
shown below:
MARKETFACTORS'
o InterestRates
oF,ndsBources .....
oCmpetition
o EconomicUnits_ RFI'sNANA_MENT INSTITUTIONALPERFORMANCE
intheArea L STRUCTURE OFTHERFI
-- oOrganization oReturno Assets
)tructure oReturn.onEquity
o _copeofAuthority oI)epositGeneration
oManagementCapacity oLoanstoRural
REGULATORYSTRUCTURI.---)oOwnership..and Borr_rs
oMandateofRFIs .ManagmntControl oProd,ctivityofStaff
o CreditProgram
•oCreditPolicy
oSupervisionof ..
RFI_
FIGURE 1. MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AS A FACTOR
INFLUENCING THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL
FORCES ON RFI PERFORMANCE
The organizational and management_policy_structure by RFIs
should be Seen as the main adaptive and adjustment mechanism
available to these institutions. •From a s positive theory
standpoint, the observed management structure of, RFIs •must
reflect the best.mechanisms.available to .RFls,,for coping with •
market and regulatory conditions. It is implied that RFIs will
design their own management structure in accordance with their
c -.
self interest, rather than based on the "equity" objective of the.
2/
government. As reported in Tolentino (1987, p. 28), the
government remains concerned with "how to ensure that rural farm
subsidies, when channeled through RFIs, are not captured by the
banker."
A number of implications emerge from the suggested
descriptive framework. One, an RFI will design its organization
and make its staffing •decisions to suit available market
• i ..
opportunities. For any given set of market opportunities, it
will seek cost-minimizing choices of organization structure and
staff. Two, the regulatory structure will be primarily perceived
as a constraint to the achievement of cost-minimizing choices.
If there are differences in regulations or in mandates (e.g.,
: L . ', ' "
size of capital across the RFI types), the effects should be seen
first in the difference in management structure; overall
,_ _..,
performance will be evaluated later. Three, any planned regula-
2/
Many RFI managements can claim that profitable results and
growth in the rural market is not possible unless they service
the agricultural lending needs of the local area. This is likely
to be true in many cases, i.e., the efficiency and equity
objectives need not be inconsistent.
6tory change, (e.g., directed at "equity" Considerations), should
be evaluated in the context of the ability of the RFI$ to
eventually modify its management process in favor of "efficiency"
or Profits._For any given state of management structure, any such
change in regulatory regime will have an adverse short-run effect
on the efficiency of the RFI.
#
In this study, the current market and regulatory regimes are
taken as given and a descriptive analysis of the management
structure of the three types of RFIs is conducted. Operational
indicators of the key elements of management structure are
identified and utilized.
Certain hypotheses can be generated from the relationship
of management structure and performance, using the preceding
framework. First, an RFI's management can be expected to
optimize, within its legal prerogatives, the use of its
resources. In banking, these are primarily the personnel, the
physical branch network .and the flow of funds. Second,
management policies can be expected to be SO designed as to
minimize the impact of regulatory restrictions that adversely
affect the RFI's funds generation and application. Third, for
RFIs whose owners dominate management, policies are the means for
I
resolving potential conflicts among the owner-management group,
the government and the other minority holders.
7Some preliminary questions on the relationship between
performance and management are presented as follows:
,I_,.If management wants to optimize resource utilization,
what policies will itselect,.for:
a) service>offerings?
b) deployment of bank staff along service lines?
2. How does the RFI choose management policies to minimize
regulatory restrictions and exploit available
" opportunities, specifically those related to:
a) retention of a certain percentage of deposits
for lending in the local area?
b) deposit mobilization?
3L Is there a potential relationship between certain
management policies and the condition whereby
stockholders themselves manage the RFI? Specific
questions which can be addressed are those related to:
a) ,returns to stockholders of the RFI;
b) lending to directors andofficers and its impact
on RFI performance.
The study involves an analysis of the operating, policies of
the three RFI types along certain measurable,, and.,,qualitative
c:,_iteria, The more quantitative indicators, of,_ management
operating policies and practices are covered, in, order to
aggregate and highlight the comparativeaspects of the issue
across the RFI types.
8III, THE SURVEY
The data used in this study was taken from a primary survey
Of 66 rural banks and branches of development and commercial
banks. A questionnaire and an interview schedule were designed
and pre-tested prior to the actual survey. A breakdown of the
responding banks is shown in Table 1.
The 66 respondent banks are broken down into 23 rural banks,
16 unit and branch development banks, and 27 branches of
commercial banks. These banks are spread out over 10 cities and
25 municipalities located in eight provinces from seven regions
of the country.
The survey instruments used were of three types:
(a) Documents submitted by the bank such as financial
statements, organization chart, personnel data, and
special schedules of selected financial information,
e.g., Directors, Officers, Stockholders and Related
Interests (DOSRI) loans;
(b) A 14-page pre-tested questionnaire in two versions:
one for unit banks and another for branch banks.
Research assistants interviewed respondents to clarify
responses, and to follow-up questions with ,misslng
responses.
(c) A two-page interview schedule for the more difficult
and/or sensitive questions.
Table 1
BREAKDOWN OF RESPONDENT BANKS
Location Rural Development Commercial
Banks Banks Banks
Region I
Pangasinan 3 2 4
Region.III
Nueva Ecija 0 4 3
Region IV
Batangas 3 3 3
Laguna 0 3 4
Region V
Camarinee Sur, 3 1 2
Region VI
Iloilo 4 1 3
Region VII
Negros Oriental 3 1 3
RegionX
Misamis Oriental 7 1 ,. 5
Total 23 16 27
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The instruments covered the general ,areas of management
structure, operating policies, and bank operating procedures and
systems, including reporting and-evaluation systems. Balance
sheet and income statements for the period 1981-1986 were also
requested including more detailed schedules for selected
financial variables, e.g., DOSRI, number of deposit ,and loan
accounts.
The questionnaire and interview schedule were generally
well-covered by respondents but corresponding financial data
submitted were incomplete. In particular, it was difficult to
obtain financial statements from commercial bank branches. For
most responding banks, problems were encountered in terms of
differences in reporting formats, sometimes leading to gaps in
line item information.
IV. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
RFIs operate within the regulatory framework set out by the
1980 financial reforms. Lamberte (1987) reviews :._the
implications of the reforms on the operations and organization of
the RFIs. From an operational viewpoint, the current regulatory
environment reduced the differences between these fina.naial
institutions. However, important differences remain inkey areas
of minimum capitalization, limitation on ownership of
enterprises, branching and reserve requirements. Lamberte ciited
rural banks as facing the most restrictions, particularly on
investments and branching. However, rural banks enjoy lower
reserve requirements compared to commercial and development
11
banks. ;t s@ems clear theft .these regulations were set out with
the entire f.inaDcial system in mind._;.However, see_-..onIyfrom the
subset, of the rural0financ,)al sectory,pthe framework.still allows
for the operation of_,three,::institutionswith vastly dif,ferent
equity ;bases ran.gimg;from a minimum of _500,O90._,f_Fr,ural.:,.banks
and _500 million for unibanks,.. A r_a_ch ques_jo_ugges,ted ,is
whether the diff.erent,ial reserve requirement can iRdeed,,:.offset
this difference in resource base, as pointed outby Lamberte.
The_reduction.of _functtonal.differences a_g ba_k types may
,have been less. effe¢¢ive due to. the_remaining)di_ference= in the
resource base .of banks. Wh-ile development.,-banks can. ,l.egal_l_y
offer services and open branches nationwide,.simiclar co,commercial
banks, the fact that these banks are.,6maller prevent them, from
availing.,;ol,this legal,opportunity. The sa_e..,ca_,be s&jd, .abQut
the.opportunity for rural banks to open.branc_h_,.S,_n a region_w),de
basis. ; The r.e_ponse,,of RFIs, .,._o the)'_-_eregulated market
environment can also be seen in the-same context,. ,Such ba_ks may
sti].l be. unable to.,_njby ,benefits from any economies ,of. scope
.(Lamberte 1987.,., p. 7) potentially: avai,3_a_le through,
deregulation.
Meyer (1987_) ,conjectures that rural,banks may be,_unable
to take up, the task of credit evaluation ._nd lending, in the
absence ,of_ thadit.ional Central. Bank_nitia,L_ed programs,, which
speci._y ,theiP-.ow_ <rules. and regulations,-. Thisca_,be taken as_-a
comme_t,;to, the potentia],, lack of ;.management. capa_,i,ty ,_nd
inadequate organ_zat_qn _f rural bankS... Centra_,.Bank',s a_empt
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tO 'wean rural lenders frromrediScounting, and speci_1 credit
programs was one. of the .agenda .@or the agricultural s_ctor in the
financial reforms of 1980-1985., Tolenti_o (1987) reviews _he
measures which Central Bank implemented to,' ....correct the
agricultural, portfolio .of banks,. He reports:that fewrUral banR_
parti¢,ipate@_i'n these programs, indicating that the. rural., bunks.'
arrearage@ _ndition still per@ists, at least up to. 1986.
Previous studies on the behavior and performance of RFIs
conclude _ thatt_ese institutions are driven by. profit_@eeking
motives in .responding ,to:market and regulatory constrai_ts._ " In
his review of the causes of the decline in formal _@riCUlCbta1
credit, _'.'.Tolentino,"(1987, p.. 5) concludes, that "'len_ers_. as
'_rofit-maximizing businessmen, , Seek to lend to those seotO,rs
Where their combinedcost of funds and supervision are re,]atively
lower, ;_under given _ _rates.¢harged on loans.". Whenever _legal
restrictions on. lending" interest rates preWented" RFIs .-from
earnihg. reasonable Profits, RFiscan simply stop L makih_ 1OanS-',t'O
agriculture. Even under .thecurrent regime .OF. deregulation,
Tolentino reports .that. risk-and default condi'tions..in " Che
agricultural loans market remain unattractive for lehder@. _
The. RFIs ,_ responses to regulation are 'consiste_it with
profit-seeking' behavior. :A._deposit retention scheme -r@quiF_s
that at 1,east 75 percent of the total deposits generated, net_c of
,reserves, should_become part of the loan portfolio of the RF.I _in
:the sa_e _ area."Lamberte (1987)found that on the bas$s:,',of
regiohally-aggregated portfolios, commercial bank (KB) branches
did not,meet this legal requirement. Here was a case where
13
manage/_nt, pollcie_ apparently, violated exp1_icit..-regu1&tory
restric_i_,@,, On_.the ....other hand , the effects of: regulato.r _,
incentives._@p.pear.more d_fficult to assess. Di.fferential.reserv_
requirements i.n.favor of rural-banksare intende_,.!to,gffset the
cost ,advantages _of l_Fger banks. • Lamberte was_unable to trace
this advantage to any superior profitability of rural banks (RBs)
as compar@d to KB branches.
Some regulatory _sstrictions seem to be less _elevant at the
RFI level.,, . The,. minimum_net worth to risk ,aSsetS. ratio is 8
Bercent @or universal bank@.and 10 percen_ .._iforother banks.
Lamberte (1987, pp. 5-6) noted that the regulation is actually
_an: in_itation.fo.r banks,_to_expand their capital." ...HoweVer, it
could also be a deterrent tO asset expansion and loans by banks.
Note that, ,the ratio i sonly rel.¢vant at the ,unit bank 1eve],,
i,e., at the RBs, development bank (POB) and _KB head, offices
rather than the branch bank. ,For example, Lamberte was unable to
ascertain the "equity" of a KB branch. The,implication is that,
while the regulation affects RBs, it can be effectively ignored
by the management Of KB and PDB branches.
Lamberte. reports the qomparative!.performance.of the three
RFI types on.the basis of reg.i.onal.ly-aggrega_ed_.financial data.
Some of the.. results have a d_rect relationship with the
differential management, policies that;each.RFl..type.appears to
have adopted,, Fi, rst, KB branches' deposit mobilization ,is more
It i@,_ conce._n of head office and the branc_ i.gnores,..it
except on instruction from the top. " '_
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extensive than PDBs and.RBs. This finding suggests the.need_.:.:'for
a cl'_oser"look into 'the organization and policies adopte8 by .e&_h
RFI type •regarding deposit mobilization. The._'s_ituation .is
reversed in the..case of loand;: The loans to deposit ratiOS are
much. lower for RB branches than for PDBs and RBs in E_mber_e's
study.,
Various conjectures related to management aspects are
offered relative to the dep6_it.and loans-Pelationships for RFIs.
Lamberte Claim8 '_that KB branch management ma'_ have greater
discretionary authority on ra4sing deposits "but .very T__i"ted
authority for Ori"ginating loans. • Meyer (1987, p_"6) suggests
that the RB may be unable "to. respond to thenew unregulated
environment where deposit, m®bilization is supposed, to 'replace
Central Bank funds." In thefaceof.the apparent vioI_tion'_by
some KB branches of"the deposltretention scheme,. Lamberte noted
that this regulation is'nei_ther strictly followed by R_Is."nor
enforced by the banking authorities.
On this aspect of institutional performance, Lamberte (1987)
found, that for the 1983-85 period, the regionally aggregated
loans of development and.rural banks exceeded 'deposits. •: This
finding highlights the importance of the Central Bank
rediscounting and credit programs to these banks. Management
have less incentive, under that regulatoryregime, .to "devejop
the,capaclty for deposit generation, In contrast, Lamberte noted
that in regions outside Metro Manila, branches of commercial
banks are specializing in deposit generation to support, lending
at their headoffices. These findings suggest certain basic
15
dlfferences _n organlzat_on and management which ire explored in
this study The aggregated data in Lamberte's_study also needs
to be verified and retired to the organization _d management at
the bank level.
Comparisons on the bas_s of profitability turned out to be
more complicated using standard ratios in the Lamberte study
Due to the disparity in deposits and loans KB branches appear
unprofitable . W_thout reasonable transfer price estimates for
fund transfers from branch to head offices, reported revenues of
KB and PDB branches are understated Even the measure used in
Lamberte's study -- net operating income as a ratio of operating
income -- is clearly deficient in this respect Given this
system of accounting, cumulative net branch losses will result
in negative equity for most KB branches This situation
makes return on equity, a traditional efficiency measure,
meaningless when applied to unad3usted branch financial
statement Lamberte suggests that future studies should innovate
on measurement techniques to arrive at the true p_cture of RFI
performance
In summary, the current evidence suggests a menu of adaptive
policy mechanisms that RFI management follows, guided by its
proflt-_eeklng motive Faced with a market condition of income
regulation, the RFI seeks low cost _nternal arrangements If the
regime is one of deregulation, RFIs will seek highest portfolio
Equity eauals assets less l_ab_l]tles of the KB or PDB
branch
16
returns while keeping low-cost sources of funds Agricultural
loans w111 decrease if loan interest rates become too regulated
or if urbanized loans yield more returns under deregulation The
alternat19es open to management in dealing with Lt__£JL
conditions is more d_verse Incentives will e_ther be taken or
_gnored Restrlct_ve regulations may either be followed or
violated, the latter case even with or without penalties
Restrictions may have full impact on the management of unit banks
in the rural areas but have no consequence on competing branches
of regional/national banks _n the same areas RFI management may
be required to simultaneously ad3ust to an incentive (e g , lower
reserve requirement) and a restriction (e g , net worth to risk
assets) Performance results come out of the adaptive responses
of management by way of functional strategies (deposit policy,
loans policy, etc ) However, extra care must be exercised when
using summary lnd_cators like profits due to the lnteract_on of
the measures with unique strategies pursued by RFIs
V MANAGEMENTSTRUCTURE AND POLICIES OF RFIs
1 Mana_emenl_S!_ructure
The basic lndlcator_ of management structure used in the
study are (a) organization structure (b) degree of
decentralization (c) staffing and management background and
(d) ownership Organization structure _s charadterized further
in terms of (1) the number of levels from the bank's chief
operating officer to the bank_staff in face-tO-face contact with
bank client and (11) the number and types of staff poslt_ons in
17
the bank organization The degree of decentralization refers to
the location of approval authority for,deposlt terms, loans to
cllent_ and Investment of bank funds Staffing and management
background covers the mix of managerial and rank and file staff
in the bank and the_educatlonal background of key officers
Finally, _he distinction, _f any, between management and
ownership are explored
These management structure varlables w111 then be related to
selected indicators of bank performance The usual aspects are
size, deposits loans and profitability To provide an initial
reference point, a summary of key performance Indicators are
shown in Tab]e 2
Table 2
PERFORMANCEINDICATORS BY BANK TYPE AVERAGE
(In thousand pesos)
..... ===================================================
Developmen_ Commercial
Rural Bank Bank Bank
1 Bank Size
a) Total Assets PlO 440 J21 823 P70,480
b) Premises 97 260 1,372
2 Deposit Generation
a) Amount 3,722 14,406 67,148
b) Number of Accounts 4,434 3,772 10,131
m/
3 Loans
a) Amount 7,137 10,838 6,165
b) Number of Accounts 980 237 63
Excludes outstanding transfers to Head Office for branches
of ¢ommerGlal banks
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The size, and complexity of a bank's organization structure
depends on bank size_, range of- services, , personnel
expertise and prevail_ing regulatory structure... ' Assuming a
certain degree of mobility of the labor force, personal expertise
.can be contrdlled by a bank through proper hiring and personnel
development policies.. The scope of services offered by all three
types of banks are similar. Only commercial bankbranches offered
other significant bank services such as telegraphic transfers,
drafts/managers' checks, foreign exchange services, and L/Cs.
Nevertheless, the great disparity in asset size and in relative
importance of each banking function makes for organization
structure differences. An extensive branch structure for
_
commercial banks can also lead to differences in managerial
authority compared to unit banks like RBs and PDBs with less
branches infar-flung places.
Unit banks..-can be expected.to maintain more organizational
levels compared to branch banks. Unlike unit banks, branches of
Commercial banks can maintain common support services at the
Central o?fice or regional level. Well-developed operating
guidelines may also allow KB branches to operate with
comparatively less need for supervision. .Instead of the value! of
financial assets held by a bank, the number of accounts may bel a
better indicator of an RFI's workload and consequent need fori a
more extended supervisory hierarchy. Table 3 shows a compari'son
of organization structure indicators for. the three .types of RFIs.
Reference can be made to standard-bank management ._ext-
books like Johnson and Johnson (1985).
19
Table 3
COMPARATIVE ORGANIZATIOR _ STRUCTURE '
AVERAGE NUMBER/PROPORTION
( Standard Dev i af,'i on)
B A N K S
A
Rural Development KB Branch • $_gnificance
1. Number of Levels 4 3.5 3.6 ,N.S.
: (0.94) (0.90) (0•52)
2. Plantilla Positions
a) Number 9.15 8.46 8.31 .03
(3.36) (3.33) (2.89)
b) Per cent of ' '
Total Personnel 84_ 76% 57_ 0.002
II '(10_) (27_) (25X)
3. Hierarchical Mix
a) Proportion of 28_ 27_ 20_ 0.12
Managerial/ (8_) (9_) (i3_)
Supervisory
Positions to
Total Staff
b) Average Number
of Customer
Accounts Per 3,995 1,985 2,4-50 N.S.
Manager/Supervisor (2,336) (1,614-) ' (1',2_1)
Kruekall-Wallie (K-W) One-Way ANOVA (correc_d'for"_es)
, ,f., _..... _Chi-Square significance: N.S. - Not Slgnl Icant at 0 2
S(Level) - Signific_bt (level)
Among r a sample of 39 RFIs RBs turned i_Out to have the
highest average number of organization levels followed by KB
branches and PDBs. Given the small sample size '_ and unknown
distributional characteristics o? the data, a non-paPametric test
(Kruskall Wall is One-Way ANOVA) was used to compare ,Lthe
distribution of levels across three bank types. The test,
". " " • c: *
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essentially based on comparative ranking, shows no significant
difference in numbe_ of levels, RBs and:PDBs maintain a higher
proportion of distinct positions in their organization compared
to KB branches, This is likely to be explained by the diversity
in primary and support functions in unit banks compared to
reliance... by KB. branches for central support .staff at their
corporate groups. Another possible explanation .may be the
difference in the number of...deposit and loan accounts handled by
unit banks.compared to KB branches.
As in the case when a statist_cal difference, is found, a
pair-wise statistical comparison can be made using another non-
parametric test, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) Two-Sample .Test.
The conclusion.regarding the organizational structure, difference
between unitbanks and KB branches is borne out inTable
Table 4
PAIRWIS.E OOMPARIBON OF ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
I. P'lantilla. PositioD as
_/.
Percent of Total Personnel .0023
RB Vs, PDB (N.S.)
RB Vs. KB (0,001)
PDB Vs. KB (0,08)
2. Hierarchical Mix
Pro.por;tion of Managerial/ ... 12
Supervisory Staff to Total
Staff
RB Vs. PDB (N.S.)
RB Vs. KB (0.13)
PDB Vs. KB (0.14)
L
K-W One-Way ANOVA: All Three Bank Types
K-S Two-Sample Test
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Table 3 also shows a difference in the hierarchical mix of
these banks' personnel Again, RBs and PDBs have more managerial
and supervisory personnel in contrast to the larger rank and file
i/
staff of KB branches This finding indicates lesser control
over . RBs as compared to KB branches There are several
operational explanations in this regard The expertise of the
managerial/supervisory personnel _n the RBs may not be mu_flc_ent
in supervising units with d_verse functions On the other hand,
KBs may s_mply be operating a staff involved in fewer banking
functions compared to unit banks The palrwise comparison _ for
managerial mix _n Table 4 also shows s_gn_ficant statistical
d_fferences along the above direction.
The aspect of decentralization is evaluated 1n the context
of a multi-branch and a unit bank environment O_e way is to
consider the degree of latitude exercised by the manager (of a
unit bank) or the branch manager (of a PDB or KB branch) in loans
approved and decisions on deposit terms Under a _central]zed
authority structure, the manager refers more decisions to a
Committee or President (for unit banks) or to an Area Head br
Central Office (for PDB or KB branches) The results on a
comparative basis are summarized in Table 5l
KB branch managers are allowed much higher loan approval
llmlts than the PDB managers although the latter's llmlts are
Defined as the number of organizational units handled by a
manager See Koontz and 0 Donnel (1984)
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,Table 5.
COMPARATIVE DEGREE OF DECENTRALIZATION
Mean (Standard Deviation)
B A N K S
RB DB KB Significance
........... w ....
1. Maximum Loan Approval
Limit of a Manager
Amount (in thousand pesos) P8,667 _43,750 P651,667 0.0001
(6,673) (41,908) (837,972)
2. Level of Organization
When Decision on Deposit
Terms are Made
a) Board 50.0% 18.8_ 4.4_
b) President/Top
Management at H.O. - 68.8 69.6
c) Manager 18.8 12.5 -
d) Board and Manager 31.2 - -
e) Board and H.O. - - 13.0
f) "H.O. and Manager - - 13.0
100.0% 100.0_ 100.0_
_, _=_ ......... _
K-W One-Way ANOVA
Z/
not far. behind. Disregarding. other factor,s, higher loan
i
approval limits correspond to a "decentralized" set-up., Factors
such as better knowledge of local conditions, availability Of
Z/
Interpreted here in a distributional sense. KB (..branches)
has a distribution which is skewed to the right. Most loan l.,imi_s
for KB branch managers are in the range of PDB's except for a few
exceptions with very high limits. One KB reported branches with
loan approval limits of _2 million, resulting in the large mean
and standard deviation values. Various industry sources
questioned the adherence of KBs to the actual excercise of such
large approval limits in practice.
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centrally _ _idm_istere_ gu+delines and faster or more personal
service are some reasons for allowing PDB and KB branch •managers
more discretion on loans, These reasons are normally absent for
accessible branches of PDBs, While PDB and RBRBs and more _ . ._ ._.
managers must pass on loan approval, to a Credit Committee or the
Board, these decisionmaking units .can be readily convened on
short notice,
Furthermore, the degree of discretion allowed to lower
level officer.s for loans may be related to the importance 'given
by top management to the' lending function. Generally, pol-icies
and decisions for the more Critical functions are;e_.pected to be
centralized and if decentralized, are centrally monitored. From
a performance standpoint, it would be intere@ttng to')find out
whether actual average 1cans are within%he, approval limits set
by RFIs as a matter of PolicY.
Deposit policies and decisions are considered top management
prerogative foral.,liRFI._:,.types(Table 5). The cbmpe_i,tiveness of
the RFIs are especially sensitive to deposit terms. Decisions
,rela_ea _o aepos_s are a_so less frequent and closely related to
how the RFI positions itself relative to the market and the
regulatory environment,
As can be expected, the background of RFI managers are
mostly related to'-busin_s or law._ This impl,ies prior',,trai_ing
and familiaPity by RFI managers with, business management .and
legal aspects. A summary of this fi_ndin.gis @i_Swn in Table 6.
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Results also i,ndica_e that most ,presidents or. man_gere ..Q_, RBs
,ar_.stockholders of their respective banks.
Table 6
•EDUCATION AND OWNERSHIP OF RFI MANAGEMENT
RB. DB KB
-1. .Educational Background of
RFI Managers
a. Business or Law 61.1_ 81.8_ 92.3_
b. Other Fields 38.9 18.2 7.7
2. Ownership and Management:
Number of banks or.branches
which are
a) Owner-Managed 18 ;.3 O.
b), Not Own.er-Ma_aged -l. IO 24 ,,,
19 ._.3 .. 24
2. Ma_Bqemen_ Po}j:_ies and ODer_tina ,Dec,isi_ons
RFi" management pol-i_ies can b.e systematically described and
compared in terms of the two key functional areas in banking,
namely, deposit generation and loans administration. In
addition, the banking business is concerned with adequacy of
capital and of returns. Bothaspects are joint consequences of
deposit and •loans•policies adopted by management relative to _the
goals, assigned toit by the owners. All these ae,l_ects , are -now
presented in comparative form.,
2S
OeDo_i_ Geh_eration
Table 7 shows relevant aata. ana statistical results for
deposit generation. References to item numbers in Table 3 are
noted in parenthesis.
Except for five RBs, all surveyed RFIs reported that there
are existing written policies on deposits, .specificalt, y, terms
andinterest,-ra£e'scheddles (Item I). Among KB and PDB branches,
such-' de_osit_policies are set by_head office/_oD management. ' A
number of RBS indicated that such polici@s are decided by the
manag@r although majority of RB's point to their Board of_Trustees
(Directors) as the deposits policymaker. Except for six RBsi the
RFIs' deposit performance is 'regularly reviewed (Item 2). The
deposit _view function is one of the main r@spbnsib_lities of
the RFI manager (and jointly with the Area Head in the'case of:KB
branches). Most KB branches carry out this evaluation function
monthly whiYe some branches do it daily (Item 3). _8 _nd PDB
branches :meanwhile, conduct their_review month]'y . _uarterly or
annually;
The nature of deposit campaigns depends on the RFI type.
KBs anchor their campaigns on a motivated internal bank staff by
giving them incentives to contact more people and enlist them as
depositors. On the other hand, KB and PDB branches' campaigns are
comparatively more customer-oriented, usually with raffle prizes
to depositors and TIPID movement schemes. Certain differences
also arise'0n who initiates and how long the deposi_ qampaigns
will be across RFI types. Host RB and PDB deposit campaigns are
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initiated, by the branch whereas for KB branches, the mandate
comes from the head office (Item 4). Most RB savings campaigns
last "only from one tosix months compared' to six months to
one year for PDB and KB branches (Item 5).
LQan_dm in_ st rat ion
Table 8 summarizes the relevant data and statistical
infer.ences in which the conclusionsin the following p_ragraphs
are based. Reference to items in the table are noted,_ in
parenthesis, Many surveyed RFIs decide to lend based, on written
loan policies. (Item I) set by the Head Office. or Board of
Directors. ' However, a significant number of:rural banks operate
without such written policies, leaving the lending decision to
operating management. The preparation of a loans budget is a
r_gular activity of loans administration for all RFl.types..(Item
2).._ There is a clear diffenence as to the organizational
locatioo, of this activity. PDB and KB branches.cen._ralize ;this
planning, role at the branch.manager or head/are_ office level.
In contrast, RBs delegate the responsibility to lower level staff
including the loan appraiser, credit and collection staff and the
cashier.
•" Except. for RBs where _the modal response to the:_,question:
"Who sets loan policies?" is "Central .Bank" (nine out of 22
respondents). ..
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Table 7
:;DEPO_:I,T GENERATION, AND NUH_R OF RESPONDENT RFIs
B A N K S
i
RBs PDBs KB Branches Significance
1. __ies .035
a) With Formal/Written
Policies 16 16 25
b) No Written. Policies 5 0 ,,_.,
2, Monitorin_ of Deposits ._03
a) Regular Review 15 16 23
b) No Regular Analysis 6 0 0 _,
3, Incentives forDPJ:_osits ,,
Generation .09
a) Presence of Staff
Incentives 6 8 '_l
b) No Staff Incentives 15 7 10
4. Decisions on Savina_
Ca_,paign
a,). Board or Head Office 4 5 1_:
b) Manager 13 5 1_,
c) Other Officers 4 1 . 4,_
5. DuraJ_i_n of Savinas
CamDaian
a) One Month z 2 1
b) Three to Six Months 4 2 7
_Z "-
c) One Year 1 3 3
d) Other 3 2 1
Chi Square Test. N.S, at 0.2
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'Table 8
LOAN ADMINISTRATION ANDNUMBER OFRESPONDENT RFIs
================_ ________ .... _ ..... _
S A N K S
ITEM RBs _ PDBS KB Branches Significance
1. Loan Policies _ 0,1
a) With Formal Written
Policies 14 14 21
b) No Written Policies 7 2 2
2, Loan Budqet °N.8_
a) Regularly Prepared 17 13 -21':
b) Not Prepared 5 3 2
3, Ma_ior Competitor
fOr. Loan_
a) Rural Banks 8 5 0
b) PDBs 2 5 4
c) KB branches 4 11 2i
d) Others 2 2 2
4, Loan Collections _._,
a) Incentive to Staff 5 6 8
b) No Incentives 17 9 13
5. Loan Restructuri n_ ' O.'t_
a) Written Guidelines 16 14 18
b) No Formal Guidelines 6 1 1
Chi Square. N.S. at 0,2.
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Wlth regard ¢o _tltlon in t4_ loans market, many PDB and
most KB branches perceive other KB _ranche_ as their main
competl_ors In !_elr area o_ _perat_ens (Item 3_ Llk@w_se, most
RB an_ man_ PDB branf_he$ perceive _l_er RBs_a_d PDBs as their
co,k_tltOr$ This f_ndlng demonstrates segmemtatlon in the loans
market of RFZs refle_$t_g a dqfference in loaB_market targets or
cllen_ele across RFI types Personal vistts/centacts by.#he bank
staff is regarded by the RFIs as the most effective way of
advertising loan services aside from posters, souvern_rs and
giveaways ,
The _mportance of Joan collection is emphasized by all RFIs
thus, _nce_%jves _n,the form of merlt _ncreas_es and bonuses _re
gIyen for effective_o11@Ctlon efforCs by the bank staff (Item
4) The _raRc_l manager reviews the lean portfolio of all R_Is
regul&rly_ Every RFZ respondent (except one PDB branch)
malntaln_d a syscem fer_monltorlng past due accounts by means of
status re_gorts on ]oam_;outstand_ng Problems on loans are dealt
w_tb based on existing guidelines for loan restrUCtUring (Item
5) However, a s_gn_flcan¢ number of rural barks do not have
such guidelines To help m_n]mlze these contingencies, many RFIs
provide lncent_ves to borrowers for early or prompt loan
repayment through interest rebate, Increased assurance of new
loans and interest d_scount on new loans.
O_ne_shio Background
Management policies of RFIs are related ¢o %he ownership
background The geographical distance between KB branches and
3O
their NCR head offices leads to an "arms'-length" _ Pelati6nship
between KB owners and branch managers, manifested in formal
management policies. On the other hand, the situation of _Bs and
to some extent, PDBbranches, is different. Tab1'e 9_ shows '_that
most RBs are managed by stockholders while few PDBs_surv_WYed
are under thesame management. Stockholders ofrural banks have
concurrent ownership of a number of other businesses, including
other_,financial institutions, manufacturing, trading and service
enterprises.
Certain _espondents claimed advantages in relationship of
the RFI with other ' businesses such as: (a),_ int_rcompany
finan_=ial "assistance, particularly with. orher financial
enterprises held by the RFI owner; (b) use of RB staff"and
facilities for transactions of_the other thrift ba_R holding; (c)
expanded client base for multiple businesses; (@) use by the
other businesses of the RFI aS depository banR and creditor and
(e) "learning experience" from the RFI enables the stOckhOlders
to .:se_ up other financial 'institutions. No corresponding
disadvantages of holding other businesses were reported by RFI
managers in the survey,
These findings on deposits, loans and ownership a_e
indicative of the more observable characteristics of RFI
..,_",_,.
management. Their l_mitation lies mainly from the
Defined as cases when the president or general manager of
t'he RFI is also a stockholder,
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Table 9'
OWNERSMIP BACKGROUND OF RBs AND POB_
RBs (n=19) PDBs (n=13)
1. Ownership ana Management _Number)
a) O_ner-Nanaged 18 7
b) Manager is Not a Stockholder I 10
2. Other Businesses Owned by
RFI Stockholders..
a) RBs., PDB,;_Thr_ft Ba_ks, etc. 10 .3
b) Real Estate/Agri-based 8 0
c) Service Enterprises 11 0
d) ManUfacturing 4 0
e) Merchandising 3 1
inability of .questionnaires to ca_t_re the,..subjec'cive and
judgemental elemen_ of management policymaking..
VI. RELATING _ANAGEMENTSTRUCTUREANDPOLICIES
WITH OPERATINGPERFORMANCEOF RFIs"
1. Mana_emen_St_ucture and RFI Per:Eorntance
The structural features of the RFIs' organization can be
related to its performance. Several questions which can be
raised are as follows:
a) Can the larger number of staff positions in unit banks
be possibly-explained by £heir larger number of deposit
and loan customers (compSred to PDB and KBbranches)?
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b) Is there a relationship between the size of the
organization and personnel overhead cost of an RFI?
c) Can the difference in loan approval limit among the RFI
types be possibly related to.the typical• cli,ent:-,group
serviced by the respective RFI's?
d) Can ownership and organizational structure significantly
add to an understanding of RFIfinancial status and
L
performance?
The difference in number of managerial staff ,positions of
unit" banks may be possibly explained by relative diversity in
services and size of client base. An extensive deposit
•generation and lending operations as shown by the large •number of
clients served, can:justify a more extensive staffing.p}an._ This
relationship is reflected in the ratio of the number of deposit
and loan accounts to the number of staff positions in the RFI.
The result shown in Table 10 supports this claim, .PDB ,and KB
Table 10
MANAGERIAL HIERARCHY AND SCOPE-OF RFI SERVICES,
Mean (Standard Deviation)
....... ====
B A N K
Rural Development KB=Branch
Number of Accounts Serviced
Per Bank Manager/Supervisor 3,995 1,985 2,450
(2,336) (1,613) (1,211)
K-W One-Way ANOVA: N.S.
K-S Two-Sample Test for Each Bank Pair: All N.S.
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branches service relatively fewer clients which may help explain
its leaner organization.
Personnel cost. is a_noverhead expense which is normally
m;"
allocated by banks • and used in priclng, ioans. H"igher •cost
structures can then influence RFIs' profi tabi Iity and
•competit_iveness in the/maf.ket,place.. Table 8.(.I.t,em I), shows that.
each RFI type has a different level of compensation ,.._pr its
staff. This may be due to inherent differences" " in
.qualifications.,r, local job.market an_i..requirem_nts."__.MeanIAgful
¢
comparisons, should theh; be made only within each RFI!_category.
In. determining whether the organization size is Fe).ai_ed.,'tothe
overhead cost of an RFT., the ratio of staff posii_ions to 't_0tal
personnel i"srelated to the ratio of personnel compensation cost
to total assets in .which a positive re'_ationship _ •holds.
Although an orBanization may increase ..;_;:i,t;s`__,staff, the
corresponding resource generated by the new staff may ilower the
latter ratio.. The result, in Table 11...(item.2") shows•signi:.ficant
• / ,c
posi.ti-v.erelationsh!p .- more staff .is .associated..w._i.th higher=
overhead cost - for KB branches but not for p]DBs,and ;SBs.
It seems more difficult to relate the difference in. loan
approval, limit of RFIs to the_ir lending"performance. Comparisons"
across RFI types would not be 'vaiid if there a_'e "clientele"
effects:, e.g., if traders go to RB brancheswhile farmers go "to
RBs. A Possi_;ble approach" for control ling 10an portfolio
characteristics in assessing the degree of decentr_alization of
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Table 1 1
STAFF SIZE AND OVERHEAD COST
Mean (Standard Deviation)
B A N K S
RB PDB KB Branch Significance
1. Difference Across RFI
Types
Average Compensation
Per Employee 28,810 35,210 59,800 049
..... (Pesos Per Year) (8,880) (24,720) (21,210)
Total Compensation
as a Per Cent of
Assets, Net of
Premises 0.04 0.03 0.02 .013
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
2. Relationship Between
Compensation as Per
Cent of Assets and
Staff Positions as
a Per Cent of Total
Personnel
(Kendall's Correla-
tion CoefficientTau) N.S. N.S. 0.04
K-W One-Way ANOVA
lending authority is to take the ratio of the manager's lending
limit to the RFI's average loan size. The result in Table 12
shows that the degree of lending discretion given to RB and KB
_ranch" managers appear to be comparable after considering the
loan sizes normally handled by each RFI type.
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Table 12
BRANCH MANAGER'S .DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY ON LOAN8_
Mean (Standard Deviation)
m
B A N K S
. RB KB'Branch Significance
Branch Manager's Lending
Limi_t " P8,667 _P651:_667 . .O0aOl
(6,673) (837,972)
Average Loan Size P11,127 _ 93,529 .0001(10,937) .(58,005)
Manager's Lending Limit
as Percent of, 135_ _1,102_-:
Average Loan Size (132_) (i,491_) N,S,
.., .. ,
Insufficient data on PDB branches,
K-S_.Two-Sample Test
The theory regarding the potential conflict between
ownership and management i.s still not well-established. It
is posited that contro.l and efficiency problems ariee_if owners
delega_e, tHe"management, of the firm 'to profess:ional managers. In
such a cats,, managers, might allocaCe to themselves corporate
prerequisi=tesand still not work as.hard (as compared ¢o.an owner
who manages .the business,_himself)..In a sense,_ this: is related to
the question of the optimal number of organizational levels which
makes for corporate efficiency. By simultaneously acting as a
_anager, an owner eliminates one more layer that separates him
For example, see Horngren (19e6), Van Horne (1983);
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from the source of revenue- the client. An often-recommended
management strategy to: cut costs and,increase_rofits +s to
reduce organizational layers separating the chief operating
_/
officers from the bank's clients.
An immediate problem arises in comparing RFIs according to
the owner's role in management. As previouslY shown, most RBs
are owner-managed while most PDB and all KB branches are not.
Consequently, a comparison on owner versus management basis
• , c
cannot be practically distinguished from that of a comparison of
RBs and PDBs as separate groups. For example in Table 13, it is
indicated that the return• on assets of owner-managed RFi's is
significantly lower while illsequity base is not significantly
different •from non-owner managed RFIs.
But •the same result holds .true for. RBs relati've to PDB
10/
branches as well. •
...." A simultaneous evaluation of the ..owne_rsh_p., and
organizational structure variables (level) .can be made by
including them in a muli;iple regression involving return on
assets. One would expect the return on assets ratio to be
significantly related to key a balance sheet ratio like deposit
to loans ratio and productivity indicators like the ra-tio of
9/
Reference to Johnson and Johnson (1985, p. 32).
10/
As Table 10 (item I) shows, K-S test using RFI type as
basis yields •significance level of .0001 for return on asset.
There is no significant_ difference in equity percentage for RBs
and PDBs.
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Table 1_
OWNERSHIP, STRUCTURE AND _FIPERFOPJ4ANCE
Mean (Standard Deviation)
B A N K
aJ
RB PDB Branch Significance
.. . • . .. ,,
. RFI Type Analysi_:_
a) Per Cent o_Total 95% 21_
Owned-Managed
b) Return on Assets 0.02 0,08 ,0001(0.07) (0.03)
c) PerCent o{
Equity to Ne_ 0.70 _ 56 .... N.S.
Assets , (0.43) , (0.44)
B A N K
2. Owner Type Analysis_ Not Owner Owner-
Managed ,H_nage(
a) Return on Assets 0.05 0.03 .02
(0.04) (0,07)
b) _er Cent of
Equity to Net_ 0.24 0.73 N._.
Ass_s ' (0.42) (0.43)
K'S Two-Sample Test
compensation to assets, The question is whether ownership and
organization levels significantly increase the explanatory power
of the regression.
The regression analysis uses return on assets ratio for 1986
as the dependent variable. A clarification on this measure is
that since Commercial bank branches transfer a large proportion
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of branch deposit to their respective head offices, interest
income on such transferred funds'waS imputed to the branch.using
the average annual Manila Reference .Rate ('MRR). This
methodological step is equivalent to an assumption that the
branch lends out its funds to head office at the current prime
lending rate. Regression results were not significant for
average compensation, ratio of personnel compensation to assets,
deposit to loan (both net loans and the sum of net loans and"due
from head office"account) ratio., and deposits to total assets
ratio.
Organizational variables such as management by stockholder/
owner and thenumber of organizational levels showed somewhat
better results, but these were at best significant at the 10
•-percent level. Table II shows the results of this latter
evaluation wherein" the signs are as expected, i.e., more levels
in organization and ownership..by management are negatively
related to return on asset. Correlationanalysis also showed
that average.loan size and number of accounts per .bank officer
are highly correla.ted with return on assets. However, due to
the small sample in this initial data, a valid regression
analysis cannot be done.
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Table 1_
NULTIPLE,REGRESSION OF RETURN,ONASSeTS RA_IOON
FINANCIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES
i" L , ,.
Regression Coefficient
(t-value)
(,e,ig_ificanc_..]Oyel,.of ._stati_jg).._i-
Variables in the Regression
Explar_a_ory
Variable 1, 2 and 3 1 and 2 2 and 3
1. DepOst¢_to Ne_ Loans -0.003 0.0018
(-0.434) (0.274)
( o;,699 _ (0.786)
2, Number of Organizational -0.026 -0,027 -.0.018
Levels (-1.798) (-1.831) (-1.350)
(0,087) (0.080) (0.190)
3. Dummy for Owner-Manager -0.044 -0.034
(-1.495) (-1;254)
(0.150) (0.2_2)
4. Zhterc_pt_ 0.1,72 0_'138 0.136
(2,919), (2,350) (2.760)
: (0.008) (0.027) (0.011)
_2
5_ R _ 0;153 O.07t _O.t04
6._F of Regression 2,44 .... 2;00 2.'81
Significance of F-Value (0.0924) (0.1574) (0.1025)
7, Number of Cases 25 27 27
The;'¢receding table •Shows that the, organizational structure
of unit banks .are associated _ith'_ higheP_ _ financial cost
structures,., The •Ownership aspect is more ambiguous. RBS are
managed Completely by _'ts owners unlike other RFZl;types, thus
any ana)ysds,_based on the ownership variable reflects all' other
RF1-type-r_]ated,_,cha, racteristtcs. The average loan size_and
4O
number of accounts per officer variables deserve further
investigation in futu_e studies.• These variables.are potentially
indicative of economies•of scalein RFI operations which are
eventually reflected in its profit performance.
2. Management. Policies an_ REI PerfQ_m@nce
Given the preceding background on differential .man_ement
I;
policies pursued by. RFIs, the analysis proceeds -along the
possible implication.s on: (a)services offered and depl_ymen_ of
staff, (b) deposit mobilization and loans performance, and (c)
overall re_urns and_"benefits tO the RFI stockholders. ....
Services OffEred aEd Staffin_
The RFI management's manpower deployment policy is a
significant indicator of the ••.relative importance .•placed, by
management'on its,service lines. A classificatign of bank staff
into•three categories, namely deposits, loans and administrative
support'showed that rural banks allocate more managers_.and staff
for loans while KB branches emphasize deposits and
administrative support (see Table 15). In this regard, POBs
operate more like KB branches rather than RBs.
• Table 15 shows the results of this analysis_ ? The
concentration..by KB and some _DB branches ondeposit servipes is
supported by the study's preceding findings on dePos_,_
management policies, Centralor area head control, of deposit
policies, regular and more frequent review of. balances, and
incentives-based deposit generation programs support the emphasis
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Table'15
MANPOWERDEPLOYMENT POLICIES
AN_ SERVICE PERFORMANCE _ R_,Is
Mean (Standard Deviat{onT.
B A N K S
a
RBs PDBs KBs S i gn i f i cance
1. Number of Per_sonnel in:
....a) DeDQsits 1.17 1,31 1.93 -
(i. 11) (1.14)- ('2.32)
b) Loans 2.7 0.88 0.41 -
(1.61) (1 ,54) (0.84)
c) Administrative Support 3.83 4.25 4.0 -
(2.57) (2 _74, ) (_.31)
2. Percentage of Personnel to
Total
a) Deposits 0.12 0.18 0.24 .02
C0,_,10) (0.12) (0.12)
b) Loans 0.31 0.08 0.05 .0001
('0. 10) r ('_..,1 _,)._ r(,0.08)
• c) Administrative Support 0.42 0.56 0.56 .004
(0.!2) (0: 12)i (0.10)
3. Service Performance
t
a) Deposits to Loans 0.52 _j_66 41.38 .0001(0,34_- f_, 6o.)- (se,_5:_.,
• j
b) Deposits 1;o Asse_s ,,, ....(0._23) (0.'30)
:a[ ......... ..
Kruska]i-Wallis(K-W) One-Way Analysisot_variance: '
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of KB and PDB branches on .deposits. •These management policies
may also be related to a "clientele" effect on the RFI's deposit
profiles. As shown in Table 16, thp average deposits at KB'
branches are much largerthan those of PDBs and RBs.
Table 16
MANAGEMENT MARKETING POLICIES
AND DEPOSIT/LOANS PERFORMANCE
Mean (Standard Deviation)
B A N K S
RBs PDBs KBs Significance
A. Deoosit/Loans.(Thousand
Pesos}
1, Average Deposits 3.7 14,4 67,1 ,0001
(3.7) (10.3) (41,6)
2, Loan Approval Limit 8,7 43.8 651,6 ,0001
(6.7) (41,9)
3, Average Loan Size 11.1 222,6 93,5 ,0001
(10.9) (218,6). (58,0)
a) RB vs. PDB or KB ,0001
b) PDB vs, KB N.S,
r
B. C_.r re lat i on_Analxs i s
Loan Limit and Average
Loan Size: Kendall's Tau 0,24
Significance 0,16
A/
K-W One-Way ANOVA
=/
K-S Two-Sample Test.
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Given the presentdata,,it is difficult to explain Why" KB
branches' lend so little compared:to the large poo:l of low~cost
deposit funds they normally generate. Several suggestions can.be
made based on Table 16. First, commercial banks encourage their
branch managers to lend to large borrowers by allowing them
higher loan approval limits Ot their level. The difference in
loan approval limits among the three RFIs is Quite significant
(per (A2) in Table 16). _, the loans clientele appears to
be of statistically different sizes for the three RFIs (see (A3).
KB and PDB •branches do "wholesale" lending while RBs take care of
"retail" loans. This suggests market segmentation and possible
;. _
specialization of each RFI type in certain segments. Third, the
"large" segment of the local loans market appear to be limited
compared to the resources available to KB branches. F_9__,
smaller local loans may not be able to pay high interest if KBs
pass on the higher transaction costs associated with this
clientele.
Another interesting question is whether the average loan
size of an RFI is related to the discretionary authority allowed
to the manager. A positive relationship suggests that the
manager ,has "a role i.n"expanding, the client".ba-se of the .RF_I to
include l'arger clients.- A statistical test (Section B in Table
16) correlating the RFI manager's loan approval limit to the
RFI's actual average loans per account, was done • f`or RBB (being
the only case with sufficient data). The" result indicates a
slight tend_cy of positive relationship between the manager's.
lending limit and the average loan size of the bank. For' the
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limited sample of this study, RBs which allowed higher lending
authority to their managers are able to reach out to larger
borrowers.
An appropriate summary is a response on the comment in
Lamberte (1987) that disparity in deposits performance by KB
branches may be due to wide discretionary authority enjoyed by KB
branch managers for raising deposits but not for originating
loans. The results in this study suggest the opposite. Deposit
policies and initiatives are made at head office and the branch
manager is given a lending limit which is far higher than the
local loans market. This implies that head office policy is the
main factor which determines branch operations. Once the head
office mandates a deposit priority, the performance of the branch
is primarily determined on this basis. The higher lending limit
given to managers may even serve as a deterrent because it
appears to be set in relation to head office lending norms (e.g.,
designed to avoid high transaction costs) rather than 'the market
faced by the branch office.
Deoos_Mobilization and Loans Performance
The limited survey data on savings campaigns can be used to
evaluate whether such efforts are potentially fruitful. SinCe
KBs appear to have far greater deposit generation capacity, the
test of any relationship between savings compaigns and deposit:
generation will be done only for. RBs and PDBs. Data is available
on savings campaigns for these RFIs, shown in Table 17.
45
Table 17
SAVINGS CAMPAIGN AND DEPOSIT
PERFORMANCE FOR RBs AND PDBs
B A N K S
RBs PDBs Significance
1. Savings Campaign (Per Cent
of RFIs) N.S.
a) With active campaign 71.4 68.8
b) No active campaign 28.6 31.2
B A N K S
.....With Campaign No Campaign
2. Deposits to Assets.
(Mean) 0.69 0.37 .02
(Standard Deviation) (0.31) 0.29
i
Chi Square
From this table, the propensity to undertake deposit
campaigns is statistically equivalent for RBs and PDBs. The
resource generation performance of RFIs which undertake deposit
campaigns is superior tothose which do not, for the survey
sample. Meyer (1987, p.6) conjectured that some RBs may have
problems in theiraggressivedeposit mobilization program due to
image problems among customers. The evidence in this study
indicates otherwise. RFIs undertake such campaigns through a
combination of person-to-person promotion, staff incentives and
prizes and give-aways to customers. Evidently, deposit campaigns
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in the rural sector are not impersonal in approach and well-
managed RFIs can think of an appropriate approach to avoid the
problem cited by Meyer (1987)..
The wide disparity in deposits generation across RFI types
carries over to loans performance. Rural banks lend more
relative to deposits while PDB and. KB branches generate far more
deposits than they can (or are prepared to) lend in. the local
11/
area. Excluding the extreme case of KB branches once more,
the relative deployment of bank staff for loans and deposit
functions is a significant indicator-of the financial (loans to
deposit) performanceof the RFI. This can be seen in Table 15 -
the .loans to deposit ratio is significantly different for pairs
of RFI types. Hence while the loan approval limits of KB
branches, and PDBs far exceed those of RBs', there are just not
too many sizeable loans in the rural areas. Given this loan
market, the relative number of staff assigned to these functions
is actually a good indicator of the financial portfolio of RFIs.
Ownership.. Management and ODeraJ_tnq Performance
The operating strategies_followed by the management of RFIs
can be expected to influence their summary operating performance.
For example, would the lackof, deposits to finance lending wby
RFIB lead to lower rates of .profitability? Is the concentration
11/
The result for PDBs may be somewhat contaminated since
some PDBs in the survey are unit banks while others are
branches.
,12/
Significance of K-S Two-Sample Test are for RBB and PDBs:
.002: for RBs and KBB: .0001.
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of staff on deposits function among PDBs and KBs associated •with
a lower overhead cost, structure and higher profitability? These
questions may be addressed using the profitabi'lity ratios as
starting point,
A technical questionneeds to be resolved in the case of KB
branches. When deposits for these banks far exceed their loans,
the branch income statement would show large deposi{ iriS.crest
expense but. minimal lending interest income. The_e losses are
aggregated in branch books leading to a negative equity position
for some branches. From•the viewpoint of the head office •, such
problems are entirely immaterial to operating ,decisions and
disappear • with periodic consolidation of branch accounts for
bank-wide financial reporting. For some commero_del banks,
branches are evaluatedbased on "contribution margins", _in_" which
a traMsfer pricing policy is implemented. The _cheme _nvolves
L. i
imputing interest income on transfers by branches of their
deposit funds to head office. In this study, return on assets is
calculated for KB branches (due to the absence of "equity")and
branch "profits" include an imputed income based on the Manila
Reference Rate (MRR). In KB branches which use transfer prices,
the profit figure is not adjusted. A comparison of return on
assets is shown in Table 18.
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Table 18
PROFITABILITY PERFORMANCE OF RFIs
Percent (Standard Deviation)
B A N K S
RBs PDBs KB Branches Significance
1, I_Leturn on Assets, Net
of PcemiEes (Percent)
a) All three RFI types 1.96 7,66 2.41 .0001
(7.02) (3.07) (1.78) "
b) Pairwise Comparisons
i) RBs and PDBs - - - .0001
li) RBS and KBB - - - N.S.
iii) PDBs and KBs - - - .002
2. Adjusted Return o_AssetB,
Net of Premises (Percent)
(Net Income +
ManagementFees + 2.67 7,70 N,A. .00i
Directors Fees) (7.45) (3.04)
to Assets, Net of
Premises
K-W One-Way ANOVA
K-S Two-Sample Test. N,S, at 0.20
With the previously described procedure for adjustment of KB
branch income, the highest return on asset (ROA) ratio can be
found in PDBs followed by KB branches and R Bs. It is likely
that the ROA for KB branches is understated to the extent that
their actual income includes a margin over MRR and the income
imputation method is applied on •ending branch ba]ances for
transfer to head office without considering turnover.
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It can: be =recalled.that,these rural-banks .....and private
developmem;b banks differ on the basis of the. owner.ship,, variable,
Since inmost oases, RB stockholders also manage the. bank, thei,r
personal (or;.family).income consist@ oR both net profits.of the
bank _nd management/directors' fees. _ If return on .assets is
adjusted ..,to .include thi_type ' of .bank, expert, as for bqth RFI
types, the--adjusted returns are still statistica]l_ different'
(.see Item. 2), i..e., rural banks have lower returns, jZt shouldbe
pointed, out thatthe key performance variable is the returns on
equity_- particularly in evaluating the incentive, and success of
owners, _in,,their profit seeking under_aking. Unfortunately, the
lack of data did notat.low the application of this measure in
this study,
The ,analysis of the incentives to owners ana interaction
with the management choices is not complete without consideration
of DOSRI loans. • From the responses given by unit banks regarding
the "advantages" of having stockholders with other business
interests, it shows that owners can obtain further incentives or
benefits_ through (DOSRI) loans to their other businesses. In
concept, the _rof_t to_ the.owner-managers, of RFIs is. equal to the
sum of the net.'income of the-RFI plus their management/directors
fees • plus advantages gained through any below-market interest
rates ow,DOSRI, l_ans_,.It i-s in•this oontext that Tolentino (1987)
points to the possibility that rural bankers capture,the gains
from subsidies t_;.(_ther intended beneficiaries ("The rural bank
failed, but the rural banker got rich").
What •analysis can show the effects of DOSRI? One approach
may be to obtain a correlation of return on assets to the amount
of 'DOSRI loans by RFIs. If DOSRI loans are concessionary ih
favor of the other businesses there should be a negative
correlation between these -two variables. The correlation
expected is reversed if the loan is concessionary in favor of.the
13/
RFI. The result: Kendoll's COrrelation Coefficient Tau of
+ 0.06 has a significance level of only 0.38. This result could
be due to the intervening effect of RFI"s expenses in deriving
return on assets . Hence another approach may be to look at the
average gross interest (income) yield on loans and oorrelate this
with the size of DOSRI for each RFI. Unfortunately, the data in
the survey is not sufficient to allow an analysis of the yields
on loans of the RFIs. Also, as previously explained, the results
may differ when • returns on equity is used. •These Would be
interesting subjects for future inquiry.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The results presented in the.paper, while preliminary, show
the relevance of analyzing.organization and management structure
toward understanding the differential characteristics !_a_d
performance of the three types of RFIs. Unit banks - RBs and:_-to
some• extent,' PDBB - are organized for a balanced 'o@Terimg :of
_eposit and loan services within their own. regul,atory
re'Strictions. .These RFIs tend to show more organiz.ati_nal
13/
The range of Tau is -1 to +1.
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levels, ,,hierarchical in staff relationehips, and organizational
positions compared to branches_of KBs, The authority ,given ,to
RFI managers appear to be more of a function of bank size (and
so, RFI type) than management policy, Many decisions remain
centralized, especially on key deposits and lending policy
aspects, Management structure was also found to be associated
with overall RFI performance. The hierarchical and multi-level
structure of unit banks is related to the higher overhead cost
structure and lower return on asset performance of these banks.
,,t Many _of the conclusions derived i n._,this sl_udy:,.support
previous findings about =the operations of RFIs and how one_RFI
type differs from another, The major ones are now cil_d by way
of summary, Eirst, like rural banks and private ;development ,
banks, unit banks operate more like community banks, serving the
deposits _ tending,needs of the local area.' _Commer¢,$a] bank
and deyelopment bank, branches are not;as oriented to community
banking, being Subject to central decisionmaking authority on
deposit and loans policy. At this time, the evidence appears to
( r
indicate the dominance of two factors: the profit motive of
RFIs and the effects of a regulatory/incentive structure
designed to favor loans to urban, large-scale ventures as cited
in Tolentino (1987). Hence, KB and PDB branches are
predominantly operated as deposit-taking branches, Second. it
was found out that RFIs can conduct savings mobilization
campaigns and substantially benefit from • them. The range of
operating strategies available to management in this regard
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appears sufficient to overcome common concerns'associated with
small.,,banks. ..
Third, the issue of "small" lending portfolio by commercial
banks in the local area may be associated with a combination of
factors like: (a) a "clientele" effect; (b) poorly developed
loans market; and (c) a continuing signal from bank head
offices that large loans are encouraged. The higher salary and
cost structures of commercial banks appear to be a deterrent for
developing their branches into community banking. These factors
also make larger loans a prerequisite for profitability ,of loan
accounts. Eourth, given the current state of small loans market,
management's deployment of its staff into loans and deposit
functions already serve to indicate whether it emphasizes loans
or deposits. Policymakers interested in periodic assessment _,of
the banking functions of RFIs can avoid the high costs of
financial audits by looking instead at this surrogate indicator.
Fifth, ,the ownership aspect of RFIs appears to be a key
variable in management decisions and RFI performance.
Policymakers should view its proposed regulatory schemes in
relation to the incentives to owners in a total context, in this
; 6"
respect, innovations need to be made regarding traditional
t
ratios. This ownership variable is the counterpart of the head
office in the case of commercial bank branches. Policy analysts
should interpret regulations in the light of the wider options
[
available to commercial banks toward a better understanding of
intended effects.
53
Recommendations are not,,,as easy.to specify.- ..... )What ,clearly
emerges is',an impression'_that a number,.of current Conditions must
be addressed • in order to bring about an_,organized deve]ol_ment of
the .ru,ra_, financial s:ys,tem.. -One,_ condit,ionis._¢he competition of
_'_restriGted" rural banks_ and "centralized" commercial bank
brancbes, Profit_seeking-_bshavior (and.restrict,ions or lack o.f
it) made,,, ruPalbanks more,,.community-based and commercial bank
branohes more centralized•in loans..
An initiative to make thrift banks establish corresponoen¢
, _ :. , :,-.' "_..', , .. ,:, "
relationships with commercial banks may enable them to operate
• .'",.
more like branches. On the other hand_ the exhortations by
pol,icymakers for comm_,cial bank branches to,be more "community
and-small., bu_s-orA_ted", will not necessar,ity.be foil,owed, by
RFIs unless , rural loans grow larger (e.g.;, local businesses
develops'):. Alt_rnati've_y,,_ commercial ban_ ca n_,,ac_ud_re more
_h,rift banks_,in-or_er<to,Bnjoy these banks' lower, cost:_structures
a,_d, be more "community'oriented ." The,,#,indings here can-also be
,.
appl-ied te branch bank.inQ,....In.a recen__news _-tem, _ .,,,_a banker
suggested "that central _ank-s.houqd g.ive incentives for, banks, to
open, • brar_hes ,in the, countryside. _Thi.s ,study suggests that
Central -,Bank should..fi,rst reexamine.the role of branch •baRks in
thec.ountr,=yside in the.o_text_of , the r_n.ge of services prior to
..granting _"im_ent:i "' yes ,.:.:"
14/
"PCIB seeks easier bank branch rules, "The,,Joupr_al.
August 30, 1988.
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Policymakers also need to look into innovative means of
monitoring RFI performance along key variables that reflect ,the
development of rural finance. A, better understanding of branch
operations and the actual iincentives tO owners and. ,managers of
rural financial institutions should enable, .,government and
analysts to understand the impact of planned regulations, and
credit programs. This is one area wherein technical,, development
is needed by researchers and analysts to enable them ,.to
understand, issues such as whether financial subsidies intended
for certain, beneficiaries are "captured" by the banker, in the
rural areas.
There are also significant,, limitations of the study,
,foremost of .which is the fact that t_e. management aspects
analyzed, in the study are mainly of the "quantit_ative"_ variety.
For example_ the measures of structure, levels and manager-staff
distributions variables do ,not necessarily describe ,fully the
various dimensions of organizational structure. The methodology
• adOpted here merely addresses the need to combine the results
across all RFIs surveyed into a "sectoral" pictur_.;_ This me=n,s
that there are research possibilities involving case studies
of these RFIs. Such microstudies can address the other
interesting but more qualitative management and ,,organizational
features. The framework offered in this. study is useful in _Gase
studies as starting point and basis for comparison of results
with a "sectoral" management study.
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Another llmltatlon is the apparent lack of reference to
related issues that malnly affect management structure For
example results of studies o# borrower and lender transaction
costs, special government credit programs transfer prlclng
pollcles and savlngs capaclty and moblllzat_on in rural areas may
lndlcate influences In the management of RFIs There are
contemporaneous studles on these aspects which need to be
evaluated
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